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Perversity as Rationality in Teacher Evaluation 
Scott R. Bauries 
Introduction 
Rational basis review is broken.  Consider a vignette: 
Imagine a student, Lisa, who is about to graduate high school. 
Lisa has already completed all of the graduation course 
requirements early and is spending her time during her senior 
year taking interesting electives and dual-enrollment college 
courses.  The state has a statute that requires school districts to 
deny a diploma to any student “who, during the final year of 
school attendance, fails to achieve a passing score on the state-
approved, end-of-course exams in the courses of Language Arts, 
Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies in which that student 
is then-currently enrolled.” 
As part of the graduation requirements, schools must 
administer these “end-of-course” exams in the twelfth grade to 
every student enrolled in one of the aforementioned courses.  It 
forbids early administration of the tests under any 
circumstances, due to concerns over cheating and test security.  
However, because Lisa took online courses in the summers, and 
completed her last graduation-required course in the eleventh 
grade, she took no end-of-course test then, and she will take no 
such test this year, as she is not enrolled in any graduation-
required course.  Thus, by operation of the mandate, Lisa will 
“fail to achieve a passing score” in all of the required subjects 
and will accordingly fail to graduate. 
When Lisa and her parents notice this anomaly and inform 
the school district, the response is to quote the policy to them, 
and to express regret that Lisa will apparently not graduate. 
 Associate Dean of Faculty Research and Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law, 
University of Kentucky.  I would like to thank the University of Kentucky College of Law 
for financially supporting this research, and to thank the University of Arkansas School of 
Law and the Arkansas Law Review for inviting me to be a part of this important 
Symposium. 
326 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW  Vol. 72:1 
Obviously unsatisfied, Lisa’s parents take Lisa’s issue up the 
chain of command, all the way to the Superintendent’s Office. 
The Superintendent, recognizing the absurdity of the situation, 
offers a solution.  A random student from Lisa’s graduating 
class will be selected, and Lisa’s graduation requirement will be 
held satisfied if, and only if, that student passes all of the end-of-
course exams. 
Would that seem absurd or arbitrary?  How about 
irrational? 
Thankfully, no school district has such an arbitrary 
requirement, but what if one did?  Would that pass muster in a 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause?  Under current approaches, the answer would likely be 
yes.  Focusing on a teacher evaluation plan in Florida, this 
contribution to the Symposium considers why this is, critiques 
that state of affairs, and offers the beginnings of a way forward, 
which, as it turns out, is somewhat a call for a way backward in 
Constitutional Law. 
I. Teacher Evaluation Practices over Time
A. Historical Approaches to Teacher Evaluation
For most of the 350-year history of public education in the 
United States and the Colonies,1  teachers were not evaluated for 
1. Public education began in earnest with the Massachusetts Colony’s “Old Deluder
Satan Law” of 1647, which provided: 
It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the 
knowledge of the Scriptures, as in former times keeping them in an unknown 
tongue, so in these later times by perswading [sic] from the use of tongues, 
that so  at least the true sense and meaning of the originall [sic] might be 
clowded [sic] by the false glosses of Saint-seeming deceivers; and that 
Learning may not be buried in the grave of our fore-fathers in Church and 
Commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors: It is therefore ordered by 
this Court and Authoritie [sic] thereof; that every Township in this 
Jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty 
Householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all 
such children as shall resort to him to write and read, whose wages shall be 
paid either by the Parents or Masters of such children, or by the Inhabitants 
in general, by way of supply, as the major part of those that order the 
prudentials of the Town shall appoint. Provided those which send their 
children be not oppressed by paying much more than they can have them 
taught for in other towns. 
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pedagogical performance or effectiveness.2  Just before the turn 
of the Twentieth Century, policy makers and theorists became 
interested in evaluating teachers.  Evaluative practices split into 
those favoring democratic participation and those favoring 
scientific approaches—the latter were the first to employ 
standardized tests and other results-based data, but only 
crudely.3  During the period from the 1960s through the 
millennium, most teachers have been (and still are) evaluated, at 
least in part, through personal observations and rating rubrics, 
usually based on one or more class visits per year by an 
administrator or a fellow teacher.4  This method of evaluating 
teachers was always subject to legitimate objections, as it is in 
the ordinary business context.  Primarily, these objections 
centered upon bias, as the evaluations in question were usually 
the responsibility of one administrator.5 
In the 1980s and 1990s, following the publication of the 
Reagan Administration’s educational call-to-arms, A Nation at 
Risk,6 policy makers became more interested in evaluating 
teachers as a means to improve schools, specifically through 
“merit pay,” or pay-for-performance schemes.7  In the late 
And it is further ordered, that where any town shall increase to the 
number of one hundred Families or Householders, they shall set up a 
Grammar-School, the Masters thereof being able to instruct youth so far as 
they may be fitted for the Universitie [sic]. And provided if any town neglect 
the performance hereof above one year then everie [sic] such town shall pay 
five pounds per annum to the next such School, till they shall perform this  
order. 
Old Deluder Satan Law of 1647, 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/ob/deludersatan.pdf?_ga=2.88969755.127
2435236.1551892292-657769494.1551892292 [https://perma.cc/ST6N-D63V] (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2019); see generally Eric R. Ebeling, Massachusetts Education Laws of 1642, 
1647, and 1648, in HIST. DICTIONARY AM. EDUC. 225, 225-26 (Richard J. Altenbaugh ed., 
1999). 
2. See generally ROBERT J. MARZANO ET AL., EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION:
SUPPORTING THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TEACHING 12-29 (Deborah Siegel ed., 2011) 
(outlining the history of educational employee supervision and evaluation).  
3. Id. at 14. 
4. Id. at 28. 
5. Arthur E. Wise et al., Teacher Evaluation: A Study of Effective Practices, 86 THE
ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 60, 71 (1985). 
6. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). 
7. See THERESA J. GURL ET. AL., POLICY, PROFESSIONALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION,
AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 12 (2016); Wise et al., supra note 5, at 60. 
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1990s, and especially in the 21st Century, many states began 
using the standardized test scores of students, at least in part, to 
evaluate teachers on the theory that teachers should be 
accountable for students’ results.8  At its inception, there were 
many obvious problems with this idea.  The existing tests were 
mostly designed for diagnostic—not evaluative—purposes, and 
few policy makers appropriately considered the many factors 
unrelated to teaching that might influence scores, such as 
poverty, family structure, race, family education levels, school 
safety, attendance, and the like.9 
Measurement experts, psychologists, and statisticians 
worked for years to account for these problems so that teachers 
could be evaluated fairly based on their students’ performance. 
Ultimately, they developed the highly controversial, but now 
widely used, technique of value-added modeling.10 
B. Value-Added Modeling
Value-added modeling describes a group of highly complex 
statistical techniques that researchers and evaluators use to 
attempt to isolate the influence of an independent variable on the 
positive and negative changes in a dependent variable—in other 
words, to determine the “value” that the independent variable 
“adds” to the dependent variable.11  When used for evaluating 
teachers, the independent variable is the performance 
effectiveness of the teacher in the classroom, and the dependent 
variable is the achievement of the evaluated teacher’s students, 
as reflected in their standardized test scores. 
Value-added models, such as the Florida model analyzed in 
the next section, use the prior performance of students on one-
to-several years of standardized tests, among other factors, to 
8. MARZANO ET AL., supra note 2, at 25.
9. See Edward Haertel, The Valid Use of Student Performance Measures for Teacher 
Evaluation, 8 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 45, 46-50 (1986) (outlining the 
pitfalls of student test results for teacher evaluation). 
10. See Douglas F. Warring, Teacher Evaluations: Use or Misuse?, 3 UNIVERSAL J.
OF EDUC. RES. 703, 704 (2015) (situating the development of value-added modeling within 
the overall teacher evaluation debate).  
11. See id. at 705 (“[V]alue-added model based on value added measures attempt to 
isolate the impact a teacher has on students’ achievement from other factors of interest, 
such as student characteristics.”).  
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compute an expected learning gain that each student should be 
able to accomplish in each subsequent testing year.12  Then, for 
each student, the model computes the current-year test score that 
would be predicted based on one or more prior years of test 
scores, while attempting to control for student and school 
characteristics that are known to influence achievement, and 
compares the current–year test score actually obtained to that 
prediction to determine whether the actual score was higher or 
lower than what the model predicted it would be.13 
As discussed above, the use of standardized test scores to 
evaluate teaching performance has always been controversial. 
Critics have objected to it for many reasons, including that 
standardized tests often measure only a narrow portion of what 
we hope students learn in school, and that they generally do so 
using the least expensive means—usually machine-scored 
multiple-choice questions—when other methods, such as essay 
or performance assessment, would be better aligned with the 
essential knowledge and skills we hope students will acquire in 
school.14 
These problems, however, pale in comparison to the 
unfairness that results when student scores on standardized tests 
are directly imputed to schools and teachers as measures of 
educational quality, without controlling for other factors that 
may cause differences in scores.15  Empirical research has 
established that, at most, between one and fourteen percent of 
the variation in student test scores can be attributed to the 
effectiveness of the teacher who taught the tested students in the 
12. See Florida Value-Added Technical Report, Dkt. 86-2, Ex. 13C, at 2-3, Cook v.
Stewart, No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2014) [hereinafter Fla. Tech. Rep.]. 
13. OLIVIA LITTLE ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EVALUATING TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS 4 (Nat’l Ctr. For Tchr. Quality 2009); see generally LAURA GOE ET AL., 
APPROACHES TO EVALUATING TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS (Nat’l 
Comprehensive Ctr. For Tchr. Quality 2008) (discussing varying approaches to evaluating 
teacher effectiveness, including value-added). 
14. Expert Report of Edward Henry Haertel, Dkt. 86-13, at ¶ 53, Cook v. Stewart, 
No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2014) [hereinafter Haertel Rep.]. 
15. See, e.g., W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure 
Educational Quality, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8, 8-15 (1999) (outlining the inherent flaws in 
using standardized tests as measures of educational quality without controlling for other 
factors). 
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subject being evaluated.16  This means that anywhere from 86 to 
99 percent of the variation in student test scores is the result of 
factors other than the effectiveness of the teacher.  Therefore, it 
would clearly be irrational to judge teaching performance, and 
then hold the teacher accountable for that performance, based on 
the test scores of a teacher’s students without first controlling for 
all of those other causal factors, none of which lie within the 
evaluated teacher’s control. 
Statisticians and measurement experts are certainly not 
blind to this concern, nor are school leaders.  Value-added 
modeling was initially conceived as a way of addressing this 
causation problem by statistically controlling for measured 
factors other than teaching performance, such as student prior 
performance, incoming language ability, socioeconomic status, 
race, and school characteristics, and thereby isolating the 
performance of a specific teacher as the cause of an identified 
learning gain.17  Nevertheless, even with such controls, the use 
of value-added modeling remains quite controversial, mostly 
due to concerns over its validity and reliability. 
“Validity” is a measurement term referring to “the 
usefulness of information that a test provides for decisions that 
need to be made.”18  In other words, concern over validity is a 
concern over the appropriateness of the inferences one seeks to 
draw, or the actions one seeks to take, based on the scores that a 
measurement yields.  For example, even the best and most 
carefully calibrated weight scale will provide a poor—or 
invalid—measure of height.  Weight and height are positively, 
but not perfectly, correlated.  Thus, using a weight scale to 
measure height does provide some useful information, but to 
validly measure height, one needs a tool that is more directly 
reflective of height, such as a ruler or tape measure.  Because 
many factors other than teaching influence student performance, 
some of which significantly, assessing validity in the context of 
value-added models is challenging.  When many factors in 
16. AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-
ADDED MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2014), 
https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-ASAVAM-Statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FF9Q-HXBF]. 
17. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 8.
18. Nancy Koh et al., Understanding Validity Issues Surrounding Test-Based
Accountability Measures in the US, 22 QUALITY ASSURANCE IN EDUC. 42, 44-45 (2014). 
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addition to the construct the evaluator is interested in affect a 
variable, the factors other than the construct need to be 
“controlled.”19 
The main purpose of value-added modeling is therefore to 
isolate the teaching performance of a particular teacher in 
driving student achievement by controlling for measurable 
factors other than teaching that contribute to student 
achievement.20  But some factors are very difficult to control 
for.21  Among these are the validity and/or reliability of the 
underlying standardized tests used to judge student achievement, 
nonrandom assignment of students to teachers,22 and summer 
learning loss, if a model uses a prior year’s assessment as a pre-
test.23  Thus, even the most carefully designed value-added 
models suffer from validity concerns.24 
Aside from concerns over validity, which can be minimized 
(though never eliminated) through careful model design and 
implementation, another problem with value-added models is 
their very low “reliability.”25  Reliability is a measurement term 
used to describe the consistency of a test in measuring the same 
construct from one administration to the next.26  For example, 
though a weight scale is obviously a valid measure of weight, 
for the scale to be a reliable measure of weight, it must read “10 
pounds” when a 10-pound weight is placed on it, and it must do 
so every time the same weight is placed on it.  If it reads “10 
pounds” the first time, and then “4 pounds” the second time for 
the same object, then the scale is not a reliable measure of 
weight. 
19. Matthew Johnson et al., Sensitivity of Teacher Value-Added Estimates to Student 
and Peer Control Variables, 2 (Mathematica Policy Research, Working Paper No. 25, 
2013). 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Preston C. Green et al., The Legal and Policy Implications of Value-Added 
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 6 (2012). 
22. LITTLE ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
23. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 25.
24. LITTLE ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
25. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 6-7; Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 44.
26. Green et al., supra note 21, at 6.
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In measurement scholarship, reliability is measured using a 
coefficient, the value of which can range from zero to one.27  A 
value of one indicates perfect reliability—a scale that reads “10 
pounds” every time the 10-pound bowling ball is placed on it.  A 
score of zero indicates no reliability—a scale that might read 
literally any value each time the same 10-pound bowling ball is 
placed on it. 
Scholarship has established that the reliability of value-
added model scores from year to year ranges between .2 to .3—
or what would be considered very low reliability—not much 
better than chance.28  By way of comparison, well-known 
standardized tests such as the SAT and the ACT typically have 
reliability coefficients on the order of .8 to .9.29  It would not be 
rational for a decision maker seeking to come to a defensible 
decision—especially an important one—to rely on an instrument 
with very low reliability.  In fact, as a recent study put it, 
“[c]oefficients at or above 0.80 are often considered sufficiently 
reliable to make decisions about individuals based on their 
observed scores, although a higher value, perhaps 0.90, is 
preferred if the decisions have significant consequences.”30  
Because value-added modeling is used to evaluate teachers for 
the purposes of promotion, tenure, and potentially even 
dismissal, reliability is a major concern. 
To better understand how weak these value-added model 
reliability coefficients are, the authors of one study divided the 
teachers evaluated into quintiles and tracked the stability of their 
27. See Noreen M. Webb et al., Reliability Coefficients and Generalizability Theory 
in HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, VOL. 26, 81-120 (C.R. Rao & S. Sinharay eds., 2007) 
(explaining reliability coefficients and their purposes). 
28. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 7 (the year-to-year correlation is .2 to .3); 
Daniel F. McCaffrey et al., The Intertemporal Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 
EDUC. FIN & POL’Y 572, 588 (2009) (year-to-year correlations range from 0.2 to 0.5 for 
elementary school and 0.3-0.7 for middle school). 
29. See, e.g., ACT, INC., The ACT Technical Manual tbl.10.2.1 (2017), 
http://www.act.org/content/dam/act/unsecured/documents/ACT_Technical_Manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z8J6-2N99]; see also THE COLLEGE BOARD, Test Characteristics of the 
SAT: Reliability, Difficulty Levels, Completion Rates 1 (2013), 
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/Test-Characteristics-of-SAT-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/32V7-BXCG]. 
30. Webb et al., supra note 27, at 81.
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ratings placement from quintile to quintile over two years.31  
They found that teachers who scored in the top quintile one year 
were just as likely to find themselves in one of the bottom two 
quintiles the next year as they were to find themselves in the top 
quintile again.32  Such large changes in ratings from year to year 
indicate that the value-added model studied (a precursor to 
Florida’s current model, discussed in the next section) was very 
imprecise, or unreliable.33  Such instability alone should cause 
concern in legislatures considering using value-added modeling 
for high-stakes decisions, especially where (as is true three 
states) the model accounts for half of the teacher’s rated 
effectiveness.34 
Despite these flaws, it is accepted by a portion of the 
scholarly community that, when meticulously constructed and 
used as designed, a value-added model can provide enough 
useful information over time to justify using model-derived 
ratings, but only as one element among others of the overall 
evaluation of a teacher.  Much skepticism remains over uses, 
such as the one described below, that assign 50 percent of a 
teacher’s effectiveness rating to a value-added model, and then 
attach significant consequences to that rating.35  Because value-
added models are often used to evaluate individual teachers for 
job-related benefits and consequences, critical to defending such 
uses is designing a model that clearly and unambiguously 
isolates one teacher’s influence on student learning.36  As 
discussed below, Florida’s most recent value-added assessment 
program as applied in four individual school districts not only 
31. McCaffrey et al., supra note 28, at 574 (citing Cory Koedel & Julian R. Betts,
Re-Examining the Role of Teacher Quality in the Educational Production Function (Univ. 
of Missouri-Columbia, Working Paper No. 708, 2007)). 
32. Id. at 574-75. 
33. Green et al., supra note 21, at 6-7.
34. See id. at 3-5 (describing three state programs that base 50 percent or more of the 
teacher rating on value-added models). 
35. Id. at 21-22. 
36. See ERIN D. LOMAX & JEFFREY J. KUENZI., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4105, 
VALUE-ADDED MODELING FOR TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 4 (2012) (“VAM recognizes 
that there are multiple factors that contribute to learning and is therefore designed with the 
intention of isolating the teacher’s effect on student learning. The ‘teacher effect’ is an 
estimate of the teacher’s unique contribution to student achievement as measured by 
student performance on assessments.”). 
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fell short of, but also actively worked against, this critical 
consideration that underlies all value-added modeling. 
II. Florida’s Experiment with Value-Added Modeling
This section reviews the recent effort of teacher groups to 
challenge the teacher evaluation system in Florida, as applied in 
four public school districts.  This unsuccessful challenge 
illustrates the perverse policy incentives and results that the 
modern approach to rational basis review yields. 
A. Value-Added Modeling in Florida
Like several other states, mostly in response to an Obama-
era competitive federal funding program called Race to the 
Top,37  Florida opted to evaluate its public school teachers using 
value-added modeling.  Under the legislation requiring this form 
of evaluation, at least one-third of a teacher’s “effectiveness” 
score, which has implications for retention, remediation, and 
salary increases, must be based on a value-added model score of 
that teacher’s effectiveness.38 
Like all teacher evaluation systems that employ value-
added modeling, Florida’s system is designed to isolate one 
teacher’s influence on the testing performance of that teacher’s 
students.39  It does so by collecting the students’ scores on the 
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (the “FCAT”) in 
reading in grades 3 through 10 and mathematics in grades 3 
through 8, and computing a score for each student that reflects 
the difference between what that student’s prior performance 
would have predicted, and what the student actually achieved.40  
Once all of these scores are computed, they are combined with 
each other, and a series of statistical controls are then applied to 
account for non-teaching factors that could have influenced 
learning gains or losses.41  The resulting score is then further 
37. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 21, at 1 n.2.
38. FLA. STAT. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1); see also Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 11.
39. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 1.
40. See Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1210 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (describing the 
program’s details as part of a challenge to its constitutionality).  
41. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 3-4.  According to the State’s technical report,
these factors include each student’s prior test scores; the number of courses in the tested 
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controlled for the overall achievement levels of the school’s 
student body, in a laudable effort to capture societal and 
community effects.42 
Once the model controls for these factors, a large portion of 
the variance in test scores, and therefore a large portion of the 
gains or losses in achievement among the teacher’s students, 
will have been accounted for by the controlled non-teaching 
factors.  Importantly, all the residual portion of the student 
learning gains not accounted for by these controlled factors is 
then assumed to be caused by the teaching performance of the 
teacher who taught the tested students in the tested subject.43  In 
other words, even when used as designed, the Florida Value-
Added Model does not arrive at a direct conclusion, but an 
indirect one based on the existence of a residual student gain not 
accounted for by the controlled non-teaching factors.44  Put 
differently, it assumes that student achievement not caused by 
the non-teaching factors specified in the model was caused 
entirely by the individual teacher’s effective or ineffective 
performance. 
Such an assumption depends heavily on the further 
assumption that all relevant non-teacher-specific factors have 
been adequately accounted for in the model, but some outside 
factors are impossible to control in any statistical model of this 
type.45  For example, as outlined above, scholars have identified 
“peer effects”—the increases and decreases in learning growth 
that a student experiences by being placed in classes with strong 
or weak students—as a factor that value-added modeling has 
trouble controlling for.46  Additionally, in Florida, because the 
value-added model compares the scores of students at the end of 
subject that each student takes; each student’s disabilities (if any); each student’s ability to 
speak and read English; whether each student is gifted; each student’s attendance record; 
the mobility of each student from school to school during the school year; the tendency of 
students to be promoted to the next grade after one year; the size of the class each student 
is in for the tested subject; and the existing differences, or variance, in test scores among 
the students in the tested class.  Id. 
42. Id. at 4-6. 
43. Id. at 6-7. 
44. Id.
45. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 23.
46. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & NAT’L ACAD. OF EDUC., GETTING VALUE OUT
OF VALUE ADDED: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 46 (Henry Braun, Naomi Chudowsky & 
Judith Koenig eds., 2010). 
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one academic year to the scores of those same students at the 
end of another academic year, it cannot control for learning 
losses that occur over the summer, and this failure to control has 
a disparate impact based on both race and socioeconomic 
status.47 
In the absence of an adequate control for summer learning 
loss, for example, a teacher of reading or math will be held 
responsible for such loss, even though she lacks any ability to 
prevent it because she will not even meet the tested students in 
question until after the learning loss happens.  In short, there is a 
significant concern that, even when used as designed, value-
added models such as Florida’s may be measuring the influence 
of factors confounded with the factor they attempt to isolate—
teacher effectiveness.  In measurement terms, value-added 
models such as the one used by Florida therefore may not be 
valid measures of teaching quality.48 
Two other major problems affect value-added modeling in 
general.  One is the problem of what scholars term “spillover 
effects”—the unmeasurable, but real, effects that a team of 
teachers teaching the same students can have on each other’s 
students.49  The other is the impossibility of deriving any sort of 
value-added rating for teachers who either do not teach the 
tested material, or do not teach any material in a tested grade.50  
These problems existed in Florida’s model, as they do to a 
certain extent in all value-added evaluation models.  Efforts to 
preserve the high-stakes use of value-added modeling for all 
public school teachers at all costs, however, led Florida to 
approve uses of the model directly in conflict with its purposes, 
methods, and specifications, and, in one case, directly in conflict 
with each other.  These approved uses led to a judicial 
challenge, which the next section explicates. 
47. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 25.
48. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, this concern alone arguably should have
justified invalidation of the Model.  See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 404-06 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (remanding for a showing that what was tested on a high school exit 
examination was actually taught in Florida’s high schools).  
49. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 10 (discussing “spillover effects”).
50. Id. at 14-15 (identifying this problem).
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B. Evaluating Teacher Evaluation in Florida
In Cook v. Stewart,51  later styled on appeal Cook v. 
Bennett,52  a group of plaintiffs challenged the public school 
teacher evaluation system outlined above, as applied in three 
counties of the State.  These three counties, with the State’s 
approval, chose to account for the lack of usable scores for 
teachers in some grade levels and subjects by attributing to those 
teachers the test performance of students whom the evaluated 
teachers either did not teach at all, or did not teach the tested 
subjects.53 
The District Court in Stewart entered judgment for the 
State and the District defendants, based on two separate orders.54  
Both of these orders held that the decision makers for each 
defendant “could rationally believe” that the use of value-added 
ratings computed from the test scores of one teacher’s students 
to assign a performance rating to another teacher who did not 
teach those students, and/or did not teach the tested subject, 
furthered a state interest in improving student achievement.55  
The remainder of this Part evaluates these conclusions. 
1. Legislating or Mandating Internal Contradictions
The challenges to the programs in Florida sounded in both 
substantive due process and equal protection, and accordingly, 
the court applied rational basis review to evaluate their 
constitutionality.56  At a minimum, it would seem, even under 
current approaches to rationality review of legislation, a law 
should be invalidated if the means adopted to serve a legitimate 
end are more likely to frustrate than serve the end, or if the 
means are developed by experts and are put to a use that is 
51. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
52. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
53. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. 
54. See generally Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part State Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 17, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (No. 1:13-cv-72-MW-GRJ); Order 
on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 17, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (No. 1:13-
cv-72-MW-GRJ). 
55. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
56. Id. at 1212-14.
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directly contrary to the assumptions on which the experts 
designed it.57  But this was not the case in Florida. 
As introduced above, value-added modeling attempts to 
address the many objections to the use of standardized test 
scores to judge educational quality by isolating the effect of one 
teacher on the standardized test scores of that teacher’s students, 
in the subject or subjects that teacher teaches, while controlling 
for the influence of other factors on such scores.  Also as 
outlined above, the assumption of the value-added model used in 
Florida is that, once all of the non-teaching factors are controlled 
for, all of the remaining non-random variation in student 
achievement on the FCAT is attributable to the efficacy of the 
student’s teacher with respect to the tested curriculum.  So, the 
Florida model’s design requires (1) accounting for all 
measurable factors that might explain student performance, 
other than the performance of the student’s teacher in the tested 
curriculum; (2) assuming that all variation in student scores not 
explained by those non-teaching factors was caused by the 
student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; and then (3) 
computing a rating for that teacher based on that residual portion 
of student score gains, adjusted for overall student achievement 
in the teacher’s school.58  If one takes this model seriously, then 
no additional causes of student achievement are possible. 
Florida’s model takes its student test scores from the 
annually administered FCAT, which tests reading in grades 3 
through 10, and math in grades 3 through 8.59  No other scores 
were used in the three defendant districts, so teacher evaluators 
were presented with the two problems introduced above.60  One 
was how to assign ratings to teachers who teach in tested grades, 
57. This was, in fact, arguably the controlling law on the books at the time in the 
11th Circuit, as reflected in the substantive due process case, Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 
F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the court explained that “the state is obligated to
avoid action which is arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve or even frustrates a
legitimate state interest, or is fundamentally unfair.”  The Eleventh Circuit, in Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as controlling precedent
the decisions of the 5th Circuit “as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down
by that court prior to close of business on that date.”  Debra P. was decided on May 4,
1981, and rehearing denied on September 4, 1981, Debra P., 644 F.2d at 397, so it is
controlling 11th Circuit precedent, but the case is not mentioned in Stewart. 
58. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 2-7.
59. Id. at 1. 
60. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 15-16. 
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but do not teach reading or math.61  The other was how to assign 
ratings to teachers who do not teach any subject in one of the 
tested grade levels.62 
To evaluate the uses to which Florida and the three districts 
put the Florida model, and to illustrate how the school districts, 
with the State’s approval, chose to address these problems, the 
District Court divided the plaintiff teachers into two groups, 
based on the circumstances that caused them to object to the use 
of these computed scores to judge their teaching.63  What the 
District Court termed “Type B” teachers were those who taught 
students in grades in which the FCAT was administered, but 
who did not teach any FCAT-tested curriculum to those 
students—a seventh grade music teacher, for example.64  What 
the District Court termed “Type C” teachers were those who 
taught in grades in which no students took the FCAT—
kindergarten through second grade, as well as eleventh and 
twelfth grade—or in third grade, the year students take only the 
baseline (first administration) test, thereby making the 
computation of any student growth score impossible.65 
The districts computed value-added ratings for the Type B 
teachers based on the reading FCAT scores of the students 
whom the Type B teachers taught non-tested curricula, such as 
music or science.66  For the Type C teachers, even this was not 
possible, so the districts assigned each of these teachers a value-
added rating made up entirely of the portion of the variance in 
test scores attributable to non-teaching factors at the teachers’ 
schools.67  Indeed, one of the school district defendants, Alachua 
County Schools, even evaluated the teachers of one elementary 
school that contained only grades kindergarten through second 
61. Id. at ¶ 16. 
62. Id. at ¶ 15. 
63. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1210 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 16.
67. Id. at ¶ 15.  As Dr. Haertel, the Appellants’ expert, explains, in two of the 
Districts, the score was actually a combination of the school portion and the average of the 
teacher portion for all of the teachers in the school, but since the teachers’ value-added 
scores would have naturally roughly balanced each other out, the scores in these Districts 
were actually nearly entirely a reflection of the school portion.  Id. at ¶ 15, n.2. 
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using the schoolwide test scores of the fourth and fifth grade 
students of a completely different elementary school.68 
It should be readily apparent that these uses were 
completely antithetical to the methodological purpose of value-
added modeling, which at a minimum, seeks to isolate one 
teacher’s influence on student performance.  As to the Type B 
teachers, assigning a value-added rating to a teacher who did not 
teach the curriculum tested, while also attributing that same 
residual variation in student scores after controlling for non-
teaching factors to the teacher who actually did teach the tested 
curriculum, contradicts the model’s specifications directly.  The 
model, recall, assumes that 100 percent of any residual variation 
in student scores left once all control factors are accounted for is 
caused by the teacher who taught the tested students in the tested 
subject.69  But the approach the districts took with the Type B 
teachers also attributed 100 percent of that same residual 
variance to every Type B teacher in the school who taught the 
same students. 
Thus, the districts’ use of the model with Type B teachers 
directly contradicted both the purpose of the model—to isolate 
one teacher’s influence on student achievement—and the 
model’s specifications.  But worse than this, it had the effect of 
holding one teacher responsible for the classroom performance 
of another teacher not subject to the Type B teacher’s 
supervision or control.  Even assuming the existence of a 
“spillover effect”70  that causes achievement effects across a 
grade-level teaching team, any such effects were not subject to 
the direct control of the Type B teacher and were therefore an 
arbitrary means of rating that Type B teacher. 
As to the Type C teachers, the use of the portion of student 
score variance explained by non-teaching school factors 
identified a covariate designed to control for school 
characteristics, and to thereby make the individual teacher 
ratings more accurate and valid by adjusting for between-school 
differences, and instead used it as the sole determinant of 
68. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of 
Law at 2, Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-
GRJ). 
69. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 6. 
70. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 6 (discussing spillover effects).
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whether a Type C teacher was performing well.  In other words, 
even though the central purpose of using a value-added model to 
evaluate teaching employees is to isolate the influence of one 
teacher’s performance on her student’s achievement, the ratings 
of the Type C teachers isolated precisely nothing at the teacher 
level. 
Type C teachers were instead rated based on the overall 
performance of students in the school who took the FCAT.  No 
attempt was made to isolate any influence that the Type C 
teacher—or indeed, any other teacher—had on that 
performance.  Rather than separating effective from ineffective 
teachers, then, the model as applied to Type C teachers rated 
every single teacher in the same school who did not teach 
FCAT-tested students or subjects as equally effective or 
ineffective.  Such a use, like the use to which the model was put 
with the Type B teachers, was directly in conflict with both the 
model’s purpose and design. 
The State’s ostensible goal in adopting value-added 
modeling as the basis for teacher evaluation statewide was 
“increasing student success” (from the State’s summary 
judgment brief),71  or “increasing student learning growth” 
(from the District Court’s opinion).72  However, the State’s goal 
would have been meaningless in the context of value-added 
assessment unless the assumption underlying it was that, when 
teachers receive lower value-added scores, they will respond to 
those scores by taking action to improve their practices, thereby 
improving student achievement and increasing their own value-
added ratings, in the hopes of both improving their practice and 
avoiding negative consequences, such as dismissal.  Basing the 
value-added score for the Type B and Type C teachers on the 
performance of students they either did not teach at all, or did 
not teach the tested curriculum, instead based the score entirely 
on matters that were outside the direct control or influence of the 
teachers, leaving these teachers no way to respond to a bad score 
to improve the achievement of the tested students. 
The logic of the value-added system itself would contradict 
this use.  Recall that, under the State’s value-added model, all of 
71. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 
(No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ). 
72. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1212.
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the residual score variation left over after the non-teaching 
factors are accounted for was attributed to the student’s teacher 
in the tested subject, logically meaning that, if we were to 
believe the model, none of this residual variation was 
attributable to any other cause, including the performance of any 
other teacher.  Were that not the case, it would have been 
irrational to rate the teacher of the tested students in their tested 
subject based on that residual—that’s the entire purpose of 
value-added modeling, to control for factors other than the rated 
teacher’s performance.73  Similarly, recall that the school’s 
overall score was not connected to any particular teacher, but 
was the State’s way of calibrating overall student achievement 
levels in the school in the tested subjects to account for the 
differences between schools as a control variable.  So, neither of 
these outcomes were subject to the influence or the control of 
any Type B or Type C teacher.  In short, there was literally 
nothing any Type B or Type C teacher could have done 
purposely to improve their own teaching in response to their 
value-added ratings, because neither the Type B ratings nor the 
Type C ratings contained any useful information about these 
teachers’ own teaching performance. 
To illustrate, under the uses of the value-added model 
adopted by the districts and approved by the State, if an 
ineffective Type B teacher were lucky enough to share students 
with an exemplary reading teacher, for example, that Type B 
teacher would be judged to be an excellent performer based on 
that exemplary reading teacher’s good performance, despite the 
Type B teacher’s own possibly ineffective teaching of his or her 
own subject.  Conversely, if a highly effective Type B teacher 
were unlucky enough to share students with a particularly poor 
reading teacher, the Type B teacher would be judged to be a 
substandard teacher, despite that Type B teacher’s own possibly 
excellent teaching performance.  The only thing that the Type B 
teacher would be able do in such a case would be to work the 
back channels of her school administration to make sure that she 
does not share any students with the poor reading teacher the 
next year.  This outcome manifestly would not serve the purpose 
of “increasing student success” or “increasing student learning 
73. See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 2.
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growth.”  In fact, because it would incentivize not better 
teaching but administrative gamesmanship, it would patently 
work against that purpose. 
Similar to the Type B teachers, the Type C teachers, who 
were rated based on the overall aggregate performance of the 
students in their schools, could not control or change the 
characteristics of the schools into which they were assigned, and 
they could not do anything to influence, for example, the quality 
of the principal’s leadership, the school’s faculty-student ratio, 
or the average years of experience of the teachers with whom 
they taught—all non-teaching factors that might plausibly be 
factors influencing the overall school score.  So, if, for example, 
a Type C teacher who was an exemplary classroom teacher were 
recruited to a struggling school to teach disadvantaged students, 
and she did a terrific job with her own students, but she did not 
teach any FCAT-tested grade levels, she would nevertheless be 
rated as a poor teacher if the FCAT scores of the students she 
did not teach in the other grades were to fall short of their 
predicted growth.  The only thing that such a teacher would be 
able to do in such circumstances would be to work the back 
channels of administration to secure an assignment to a more 
advantaged school.  Once again, since it would incentivize 
administrative gamesmanship rather than better teaching, this 
outcome would be manifestly at odds with the ostensible state 
goal of “increasing student success” or “increasing student 
learning growth.”74 
The District Court’s opinion elided these obvious problems 
and judged to be “rational” a severely attenuated—one might 
say fanciful—theory of causation that was squarely at odds with 
both the purpose of value-added modeling and the evidence in 
the record.75  This theory of causation held that the defendants 
“could rationally believe” that, by contributing positively or 
negatively to the overall learning environment of the school, 
each teacher in a school would have effects on the performance 
of their own students and that of other students in the school in 
subjects and grades the teacher did not teach.76  It was therefore 
74. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 71, at 19; Stewart, 28 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1212. 
75. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
76. Id. 
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rational for the defendants to rate these Type B and Type C 
teachers’ effectiveness based on student performance in subjects 
and/or grades these teachers did not teach.77 
Thus, the court’s theory of causation, which the State 
defendants offered, but which the court devised on behalf of the 
districts (which had not even moved for summary judgment 
themselves), converted the theorized “spillover effect,” a 
confounding factor for which value-added modeling is supposed 
to control, into the independent variable in the analysis for the 
Type B teachers.78  And it converted overall school-level student 
achievement, another confounding factor for which the model 
was supposed to control, into the independent variable for the 
Type C teachers.79 
Under the District Court’s reasoning, if the teacher 
evaluation systems in the Districts were instead based on 
increases and decreases in sales of healthy food in the school 
lunchroom (either to the teacher’s own students or to the student 
body as a whole), then it would be “rational” to hire, fire, tenure, 
deny tenure to, or otherwise discipline the teachers based on 
those sales because it is conceivable that one could rationally 
believe that all teachers in a school should be promoting healthy 
lifestyles, and that the healthier a student’s eating choices are, 
the more likely that student will be ready, willing, and able to 
learn—thereby improving student achievement.  Obviously, 
using such a method for rating teachers would be ridiculous, but 
the Type B and Type C teachers had no more control over the 
teaching of their colleagues in other grades and/or subjects than 
they did over the sales abilities of the cafeteria staff in their 
schools. 
Considering the State’s purported justification for its value-
added model of improving student achievement by holding 
teachers accountable for the test results they produce, it is 
impossible to square the methods described above with that 
goal.  In fact, by holding teachers accountable for performance 
they can influence only incidentally, if at all, the model as 
applied to the Type B and Type C teachers worked directly 
against this goal.  Moreover, the model adopted in the 
77. Id. at 1212-14. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1211-15. 
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defendants’ districts, which was adapted from a state-level 
model carefully constructed by experts, directly violated the 
assumptions these experts used to construct their model.  At a 
minimum, even under the current, very deferential approach to 
rational basis review, adopting means that directly frustrate 
one’s stated goals and underlying assumptions should have been 
a bridge too far. 
2. Legislating without Seeking Objective Expert
Information 
More controversially, earlier approaches to rationality 
review, such as those employed in the Lochner era, would not 
only seek to know whether the means adopted to serve a 
legitimate legislative end would instead frustrate that end, but 
also whether the legislature had established, as a factual matter, 
the need for the means it had chosen, and the effectiveness of 
the chosen means at meeting the need.  Based on the majority 
opinion in Lochner, the failure of the New York legislature to do 
so was what doomed its maximum hours law.80  But here again, 
against the challenge that the Florida legislature’s chosen use of 
value-added modeling to judge one teacher’s effectiveness based 
on the scores of another teacher’s students lacked support, the 
court upheld the law.81 
Measurement scholarship has established that between one 
and fourteen percent of a student’s standardized test score gains 
can be attributed to the effectiveness of the student’s teacher in 
the tested subject based on value-added modeling, and that only 
where careful controls are placed on the model.82  However, no 
scholarship whatsoever has established that any portion of a 
student’s test score performance can be isolated and explained 
by the teaching performance of teachers who do not teach that 
student, or who do not teach the tested curriculum. 
This lack of scholarly support is not surprising.  The uses to 
which the districts put Florida’s value-added model were 
directly in conflict with the purpose of value-added modeling.83  
80. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62-64 (1905).
81. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212-14 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
82. AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16.
83. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 57.
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One need not be a measurement expert to understand why there 
is a complete lack of any scholarship even hinting at examining 
the hypothesis that one employee’s performance can be assessed 
based on the performance of a completely different employee 
over whom the evaluated employee has no control or authority. 
Scholars do not study these methods for the same reason they do 
not evaluate whether to award a diploma to one student based on 
another student’s standardized test scores, as in the vignette at 
the beginning of this article—it is facially preposterous and 
patently irrational to even consider doing that.  Likewise, it is 
preposterous to believe that one teacher can or should be held 
accountable for the growth or lack thereof in test scores of 
students they do not teach, or on tests given to assess a 
curriculum they do not teach, and for which they do not claim 
any expertise. 
No rational school district would voluntarily adopt such a 
system, no rational parents would choose to have their children’s 
teachers evaluated in this manner, and no rational teacher would 
choose to be evaluated in this way.  The District Court even said 
as much in the conclusion to its Order granting summary to the 
State and districts: 
The unfairness of the evaluation system as implemented is 
not lost on this Court. We have a teacher evaluation system 
in Florida that is supposed to measure the individual 
effectiveness of each teacher. But as the Plaintiffs have 
shown, the standards for evaluation differ significantly. 
FCAT teachers are being evaluated using an FCAT VAM 
that provides an individual measurement of a teacher’s 
contribution to student improvement in the subjects they 
teach. The FCAT VAM has been applied to Type B 
teachers as well, but perversely it can only measure student 
improvement in subjects not taught by the Type B teacher. 
For Type C teachers the FCAT VAM has been applied as a 
school-wide composite score that is the same for every 
teacher in the school. It does not contain any measure of 
student learning growth of the Type C teacher’s own 
students. To make matters worse, the legislature has 
mandated that teacher ratings be used to make important 
employment decisions such as pay, promotion, assignment, 
and retention. Ratings affect a teacher’s professional 
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reputation as well because they are made public—they have 
even been printed in the newspaper. Needless to say, this 
Court would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would 
find this evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let 
alone be willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.84 
But in the next breath, the court stated, “[f]or reasons that 
have been explained, the State Defendants could rationally 
conclude that the evaluation policies further the state’s 
legitimate interest in increasing student learning growth.”85 
To recap, despite acknowledging that it would be difficult 
to find a person who would themselves be willing to be 
evaluated in this way, the court felt compelled to find that two 
evaluation programs, one of which rated the performance of 
teachers based on the test scores students they did not teach the 
tested material, and the other of which rated their performance 
based on the test scores of students they did not teach at all, 
were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of 
improving student achievement.  Both of these rating plans 
stood in direct conflict with both the purpose of the program and 
the specifications of the model derived through hours of 
professional work.  Despite the fact that neither of these groups 
of rated teachers received any information from the ratings that 
they could individually use to improve their own teaching 
practice, the courts held that the government “could rationally 
believe” that so rating these teachers, and then attaching 
potentially extreme consequences to the ratings, would 
somehow improve student achievement.  And under the law 
today, these decisions were likely correct.  So, why did the 
District Court—and the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
rulings in all respects86— feel compelled to conclude that the 
program was rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest? 
III. Rational Basis Review and the Lochner Recoil
The answer is the modern approach to rational basis 
review.  Review of legislation for whether it bears a rational 
84. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1215-16. 
85. Id. at 1216.
86. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1294 (2015). 
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relationship to a legitimate legislative interest in the public 
health, safety, welfare, or morals has been a feature of 
constitutional law for a very long time.  The traditional approach 
to review of legislation under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—what is generally referred to as 
“substantive due process”—is exemplified by the cases decided 
in what is now known as the “Lochner Era.” 
Lochner v. New York,87  a case so infamous as to have a 
place in the “anticanon”88  alongside such judicial 
embarrassments as Korematsu v. United States89  and Dred Scott 
v. Sandford,90  invalidated a New York law limiting the number
of hours a baker could be required to work to no more than sixty
per week.91  Today, the case is nearly universally reviled, chiefly
due to its recognition of a right to contract to sell one’s labor as
a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  This recognition—which stemmed from cases
preceding Lochner, but was forcefully applied in Lochner—
allowed, or at that time required, the Court to examine the law as
a valid exercise of the police power of New York to regulate the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens.92
In conducting its review, the Court considered the State’s 
proffered justification that regulating the hours of weekly work 
for a baker was an exercise of the power to regulate the public 
health, the argument being that extended work in baking exposes 
workers to a higher risk of respiratory ailments.93  Stating its 
role in reviewing such legislation where the liberty interest in 
question is the liberty to enter into labor contracts, the Court set 
forth that era’s version of rational basis review: 
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the 
valid exercise of the police power by the State. There is no 
dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the 
legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and 
87. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905). 
88. For a detailed and careful treatment of the “anticanon,” which includes Lochner, 
see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
89. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
90. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
91. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 50-51. 
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it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was 
enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of 
the people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how 
absolutely without foundation the claim might be. The 
claim of the police power would be a mere pretext — 
become another and delusive name for the supreme 
sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from 
constitutional restraint. This is not contended for. In every 
case that comes before this court, therefore, where 
legislation of this character is concerned and where the 
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the 
question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and 
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is 
it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference 
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to 
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may 
seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of 
himself and his family? Of course the liberty of contract 
relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as 
much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.94 
The Court did not mention anything about “fundamental” 
rights,95 even though other courts of the era sometimes used that 
adjective.96  Following this statement, the Court analyzed the 
State’s health-based justification and found a factual foundation 
for it lacking: 
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health 
law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of 
individuals, both employers and employes [sic], to make 
contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may 
think best, or which they may agree upon with the other 
parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature of that under 
review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent 
men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome 
interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are 
not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are 
94. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
96. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (“That the State may do 
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, 
mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which 
must be respected.”). 
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passed in the exercise of the police power and upon the 
subject of the health of the individual whose rights are 
interfered with, unless there be some fair ground, 
reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is material 
danger to the public health or to the health of the employes 
[sic], if the hours of labor are not curtailed.97 
The emphasized portion above sets up the means-ends 
scrutiny that is now familiar to any student of constitutional law, 
but it sets up a particularly searching and skeptical version of it, 
requiring the establishment of an objectively reasonable concern 
that requires a legislative remedy of the type the legislature has 
chosen—a concern that actually motivated the legislature’s 
choice.98 
Rhetorically, at least, this test is not as far removed from 
current approaches as the case’s status in the “anticanon” would 
indicate.  Nevertheless, it was not long before the Court chose to 
abandon review of statutes for substantive reasonable necessity, 
documented by facts presented and proved by the state 
defendant, opting instead to establish a tiered form of scrutiny 
based on which some rights could be deemed “fundamental,” 
and therefore subject to searching judicial review,99 while others 
were left to a modern rationality review that was judicial review 
in name only. 
This move had earlier roots, but began in earnest with West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish100 and United States v. Carolene 
97. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (1905) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 64. 
99. Id. 
100. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  Contrary to most popular conceptions, the approach to 
substantive due process reflected in Parrish did not differ materially from that reflected in 
Lochner:  
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty 
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In 
prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute 
and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and 
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization 
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the 
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the 
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and 
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the 
interests of the community is due process. 
Id. at 391.  This formulation is broadly consistent with the means-ends scrutiny laid out by 
the Lochner Court, which also required the legislation to have been adopted for a police 
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Products, Inc, particularly its famous footnote 4,101  and found 
its full expression in Griswold v. Connecticut.102  In Griswold, 
the Court considered the continuing reach of Lochner and finally 
issued a clear abrogation of the decision, beginning, 
“[o]vertones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U. S. 45, should be our guide. But we decline that 
invitation . . .”103  The Court then drew the now-familiar line 
between fundamental rights that qualify for searching judicial 
review and other, more quotidian matters, stating, “[w]e do not 
sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business 
affairs, or social conditions,” before distinguishing the 
contraception restriction at issue from such laws.104  This 
power-related interest and to be reasonably related to that interest.  Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 56, 61 (1905). 
101. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  The text of Footnote 4 is a significant break from
Lochner’s approach (and I would argue with Parrish’s, as well), as it begins the move 
toward the more categorical and tiered approach to constitutional scrutiny that is dominant 
today:   
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth.  
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most 
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote; on restraints 
upon the dissemination of information; on interferences with political 
organizations; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious or national, or racial minorities : 
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Id. (citations omitted).  But as a decision, it holds that Congress indeed had a rational 
legislative purpose for regulating filled milk, one reflected in the exhaustive work of 
legislative staffers and debated in multiple committee hearings, and one that was reflected 
in the statute itself.  See id. at 148-49 (reviewing this evidence).   
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
103. Id. at 481-82.
104. Id. at 482.  Of course, this was a slight mischaracterization of judicial review
during the Lochner era, which did not purport to judge the “wisdom” or “propriety” of laws 
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distinction had the permanent effect of dividing the task of 
judicial review of laws for constitutionality into two tiers, a task 
begun in the famous footnote from Carolene Products, but 
cemented into our jurisprudence in Griswold. 
Under the current tiered form of scrutiny that flows from 
Carolene Products and Griswold, legislation that places burdens 
on fundamental rights will be struck down unless the 
government can establish that the legislation is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling government interest.105  In contrast, mere 
social and economic legislation that does not interfere with a 
fundamental right will be upheld unless shown to lack “a 
reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest.”106  This latter 
test sounds quite similar to the Lochner era analysis, certainly 
placing the burden of proof on the party seeking invalidation, 
but also seeming to require an actual purpose motivating the 
legislation, and a rational relationship between the means chosen 
by the legislature and the purpose it pursues.  But in modern 
application, the standard is dramatically different. 
Over time, the New Deal and post-New Deal Courts’ 
disapprovals of the outcome of Lochner, but retention of the 
prospect of judicial review upon a showing of a law’s lack of 
reasonable foundation or relationship to a legitimate end, has 
morphed into what amounts to judicial abdication or abstention 
from review entirely in most cases.  The current approach had its 
roots in Williamson v. Lee Optical,107  but found its full 
expression in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc,108  an equal 
protection case that has been understood to articulate the rational 
basis standard that applies in substantive due process cases, as 
well.109 
but did ask legislatures to justify the “need” for them to serve a legitimate interest 
stemming from the police power.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
105. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1982) (explaining the levels of 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). 
106. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
107. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at 
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was 
a rational way to correct it.”). 
108. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
109. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (equating the two standards); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766 (setting forth the 
rational basis test for substantive due process). 
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Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in FCC, made clear 
that the modern approach to rational basis review is not really a 
doctrine of review at all, but closer to a qualified abstention 
doctrine.110  Under this approach, which has been followed in 
most federal court decisions since, a statute must be upheld 
under rational basis review “if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification.”111  The legislature does not have to proffer 
such a justification—rather, the Court has the duty to imagine a 
“conceivable state of facts” that could have motivated the 
legislature.112  In addition, “those attacking the rationality of the 
legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it.’”113  Moreover, “it is 
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the 
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature,” because the Court “never insisted that 
a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”114  
In fact, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom 
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”115 
Thus, under the current approach the courts have 
developed, the court must uphold the legislation unless the 
plaintiff invalidates any and all conceivable justifications for the 
means chosen, whether real or imagined.  The government does 
not bear any burden of production or persuasion as to either the 
ends it seeks to serve or the means it has chosen to serve such 
ends.116  This extreme deference that courts now give to most 
legislative enactments requires neither fact nor logic to sustain 
their rationality—it even indulges judicial speculation of what a 
legislature “could rationally believe,”117  without any 
110. FCC, 508 U.S. at 313-14.
111. Id. at 313. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 
364 (1973)). 
114. Id. (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 
(1980)). 
115. Id. 
116. Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 897, 912 (2005).
117. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1213 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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requirement to even found that speculation in evidence of which 
the legislature would have been aware at the time. 
This regime, in its application if not its rhetoric, is 
obviously a far cry from that of the Lochner era, and even, I 
would argue, the era in which Lochner was initially 
disapproved, and then rejected.118  It is also inconsistent with 
any concept of judicial review stretching beyond abstention, and 
it is worth asking whether we made a wrong turn in moving 
quite so far away from that era’s constitutional norms.  The 
following section proposes a potential correction, focusing on 
the salutary features of Lochner-era jurisprudence that need not 
have been left behind in the effort to reject its problematic 
implications for labor law and the New Deal. 
IV. Reviving Rational Basis Review
The extreme, yet real and recent, example from Florida 
above illustrates that rational basis review of substantive due 
process claims has become little more than judicial abdication—
something more akin to the political question doctrine than an 
actual doctrine of merits review.  This Part makes the case for a 
way forward, which turns out to be a way backward in 
Constitutional law. 
The examples of the absurdity of results that the current 
approach to rational basis review produces are legion.  Many 
have been outlined in the careful work of constitutional lawyer 
Clark Neily,119  and others have been catalogued over the years 
in other scholarship.120  Although not highlighted much in 
discussions of the decision, Justice Marshall’s liberal dissent to 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez also spends significant time criticizing 
the too-lenient approach of the majority in reviewing Texas’s 
property-tax-based school funding program for rationality.121  In 
particular, Justice Marshall outlines the lack of factual 
118. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Parrish, Carolene
Products, and Griswold). 
119. E.g., Neily, supra note 116, at 903-13. 
120. E.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to be Free of 
Arbitrary Legislation, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 503 (2016). 
121. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (criticizing rigid tiered scrutiny, and arguing for more of a sliding scale of 
review). 
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foundation or logic underlying Texas’s purported justification of 
preserving “local control” in relation to its chosen means of 
funding education primarily through local property taxation, 
which creates substantial inequalities in funding throughout the 
state’s school districts, leaving wealthy districts with enough 
funding to truly exercise local control, while saddling poor 
districts with barely enough money to make a decent effort at 
meeting the most basic of state standards.122  In choosing to fight 
on this ground and highlight the internal contradictions in 
Texas’s school funding plan, Justice Marshall draws 
substantially from the pre-FCC, and even pre-Griswold, 
approach to rational basis review. 
The decades-long move away from the Lochner era was a 
well-intentioned one, which sought to preserve both the 
expansions in worker protections that both preceded and 
followed the Great Depression and to forestall opportunistic 
challenges to New Deal and Great Society legislation.  But it 
overshot its mark.  The proof of this overshooting lies in 
decisions that nominally fell under the nearly absolute 
deference-based standard articulated in FCC, but which 
nevertheless came in for far more searching judicial review. 
Beginning with Plyler v. Doe,123  the Court confronted a 
case in which it had made clear less than a decade prior that 
strict judicial scrutiny did not apply.124  In Plyler, the statute 
under challenge denied any public educational services to 
undocumented immigrants residing in Texas.125  The Court 
quickly reaffirmed its holding in Rodriguez that education was 
not a fundamental right for the purpose of due process or equal 
protection analysis, but also made the point that it was not 
equivalent to any ordinary social benefit either.126  It also held 
that undocumented immigration status could not be treated as a 
suspect classification.127  These two holdings should have 
shunted the case into rational basis review territory.  And 
rhetorically, it did, as the Court referred to “rationality” in 
122. Id. at 126-28.
123. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
124. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26.
125. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
126. Id. at 221.
127. Id. at 223. 
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preparing to conduct its review, but the Court also laid out a 
particularly searching form of rationality review—one more 
reminiscent of Lochner than FCC: “[i]n determining the 
rationality of § 21.031, we may appropriately take into account 
its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its 
victims.”128 
Upon a skeptical review, the Court rejected purported 
justifications for the law based on national immigration 
policy;129  conservation of scarce state resources;130  preventing 
an influx of undocumented immigrants into the state;131  the 
special burdens that undocumented immigrant children place on 
state educational delivery;132  and a lack of expected benefit to 
the state due to the tendency of migrants to move around the 
country.133  In most cases, the Court rejected these justifications 
due to their lack of evidentiary support in the record.134  In short, 
the Court, even though it applied rational basis review, actually 
engaged in judicial review.  Despite prior judicial protestations 
to the contrary,135  the sky did not fall, and the legislature 
adjusted, and then went right on legislating. 
The Court went even further in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,136  rejecting the idea of a quasi-
suspect classification for the mentally disabled, and holding that 
rational basis review would apply to a local ordinance placing 
significant burdens on obtaining a permit to build a living center 
for those with mental disabilities.137  But even though the Court 
selected this highly-deferential standard, it nevertheless upheld 
the lower court’s decision striking down the ordinance, stating, 
“[b]ecause in our view the record does not reveal any rational 
basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any 
128. Id. at 224.
129. Id. at 226. 
130. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 227.
131. Id. at 228. 
132. Id. at 229. 
133. Id. at 230. 
134. Id. at 224-30. 
135. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake 
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973) (“Only by faithful adherence to this 
guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative 
branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”)). 
136. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
137. Id. at 446-47. 
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special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the 
judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as 
applied in this case.”138 
Rather than imagining a rational basis that “could have” 
motivated the adoption of the ordinance, the Court reviewed 
what the city claimed actually motivated its adoption, and found 
itself not convinced.139  The Court ultimately held: 
“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case 
appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the 
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely 
supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly 
provided for by state and federal law.”140 
Rejecting each of five different justifications the city 
offered for the ordinance, the Court illustrated that judicial 
skepticism of even claims of legitimate governmental ends is 
warranted in at least some cases, even where fundamental rights 
and suspect classifications are not at issue. 
Perhaps these decisions can be explained by the fact that 
they both pre-dated FCC and its articulation of the extremely 
deferential approach in an authoritative way, or perhaps because 
they were both equal protection cases, rather than substantive 
due process cases.  But FCC did not make any effort to abrogate 
or overrule these cases, and the rational basis standard has long 
been applied coextensively and consistently between equal 
protection and substantive due process cases.  They were also 
followed by other rulings that nominally fell into the rational 
basis category but wound up applying a more Lochner-like form 
of rational basis review than one would have expected with FCC 
on the books.141 
138. Id. at 448.
139. Id. at 448-50. 
140. Id. at 450.
141. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-35 (1996) (applying rational basis 
review to invalidate a Colorado constitutional amendment for irrationally imposing 
legislative disabilities on gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in local government); Quinn v. 
Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (invalidating a property ownership requirement to sit on a 
county land use board as an irrational classification).  For a detailed treatment of all 
Supreme Court cases since 1971 in which the Court has applied rational basis review in a 
searching way more reminiscent of Lochner than FCC, see Note, Raphael Holoszyc-
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Based on the discussion above, the level of judicial 
deference reflected in FCC, and in the Florida suit challenging 
aberrant uses of value-added modeling, is neither obligatory on 
the courts nor uniquely preservative of the separation of powers. 
This means that there is no real principled basis to consign the 
substantive due process method of the Lochner era to the trash 
heap.  Rather, we should reconsider at least requiring some level 
of means-ends connection, presumed to exist absent a challenge, 
but able to be put at issue by a plaintiff bearing a burden of 
proof.  Only this burden should be one actually possible to meet 
through documentable fact, expert testimony, legislative history, 
etc., that negatives the connection between the asserted goal and 
the means chosen to meet it, or through some other showing that 
this ends-means relationship was not actually the basis for a 
challenged piece of legislation.  Had this opportunity been 
available to the plaintiffs in Cook v. Stewart, it is likely that at 
least one, and perhaps both, groups of teachers would have 
prevailed.  The plaintiffs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez would 
have had a road to victory, as well, not to mention the scores of 
individuals seeking to operate businesses that present no danger 
to the public, and who are burdened by restrictions on their right 
to earn a living that have no connection to public health, safety, 
or welfare.142 
I have argued in the past that, under both the United States 
Constitution and every state constitution, government stands in a 
fiduciary capacity in relation to the people.143  Others have also 
claimed that, in our republican form of government, we delegate 
to our elected officials the power to act on our behalf, and in 
accepting that delegation and power, they assume the duty to act 
in our best interests, and to do so both faithfully and 
rationally.144 
Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 2070, 2106-17 (2015).
142. For a thorough sampling of such individuals, see Neily, supra note 116.
143. Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 
48 GA. L. REV. 949, 986-87 (2014); Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 705 (2012) [hereinafter Education Duty]. 
144. See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis 
Inquiry and the Federal Government’s Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1385, 1405 (2017) 
(arguing for fiduciary duty as the basis of rational basis review); Sotirios A. Barber, Are 
Professors Lawson and Seidman Serious about a “Fiduciary Constitution”? , 69 FLA. L. 
REV. F. 10, 11 (2017), http://www.floridalawreview.com/issue/volume-69/ 
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Some who agree with this claim place rational basis review 
within the duty of due care, on the theory that fiduciaries assume 
a baseline duty to act rationally as to their entrusted work.145  
This conception would seem to support something more than the 
rational basis review of today—but not much more.  The duty of 
care in other fiduciary contexts is typically enforced through 
some form of process-based review, with the overall rationality 
of the decision not being directly questioned.  Accordingly, I see 
the duty of care as more fitted to the limited circumstances in 
which a legislature or other government actor assumes a positive 
duty to act, such as under state constitutional education 
clauses.146  My own work places all individual negative rights 
enforcement under the duty of loyalty.147  In the absence of 
specified duties to legislate on particular matters, such as 
education in the states, legislative duty stems from its 
discretionary power to legislate—or not legislate.  But 
understanding that legislative positions are delegations of 
authority from the public, not patronages or sinecures for 
personal enrichment, means that legislatures cannot legislate 
beyond the background basis for their delegated power. 
Underlying this power is the background duty to legislate in the 
best interests of the entrusting public—to have a public purpose 
for legislating, and to legislate in a way that is directed is 
serving that purpose. 
This bedrock requirement is what forms the basis of the 
“police power”—the starting point of all rational basis review of 
state action during the Lochner era.  An act that either legislates 
outside of the police power, or uses the police power 
oppressively, pretextually, or in a self-dealing way, is therefore 
an act that is disloyal to the beneficiary of the legislative duty—
the public.  If this is so, and it seems abundantly clear in both the 
[https://perma.cc/KDR6-QRHX] (“Indeed, a fiduciary constitution would seem to compel 
substantive reasonableness for any governmental act.  No mentally competent person 
would voluntarily delegate power to an agent to be exercised carelessly or pretextually or 
for anything less than an understanding and reasonably competent pursuit of the principal’s 
interest.”). 
145. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 144, at 1404-07. 
146. Education Duty, supra note 143, at 747-48. 
147. Education Duty, supra note 143, at 747-48. 
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founding documents and their influences,148  then the courts are 
on sound footing reviewing legislation for substantive 
rationality.  Indeed, given their role and their co-equal status as 
public fiduciaries, the courts themselves likely have their own 
fiduciary duties to engage in such review, and to do so in a 
searching way.149  Reviewing—actually reviewing—legislation 
for whether it is rationally directed to serve a proper legislative 
purpose is therefore the proper and legitimate role for the courts, 
one they have abdicated over time by gradually ratcheting down 
the standards for legislative rationality. 
Conclusion 
Some may view the current practice of rational basis 
review as a correct reflection of the extreme deference that 
courts should afford legislative acts, exemplified by the common 
state constitutional law refrain that legislation should not be 
invalidated unless its unconstitutionality is shown “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”150  Others might posit that the staying power 
of rational basis review, as practiced in the modern era, is 
justified by a fear of re-Lochnering the Constitution.151  But we 
do not have to love Lochner itself to seek to restore its mode of 
rational basis review. 
My project here has not been to apologize for or defend the 
outcome of the Lochner decision itself.  I have my own views as 
148. See, e.g., EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS 
FIDUCIARY 28-51 (2011); GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE 56–57 (2010); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal 
Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259, 260–61 (2005); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of 
Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 120 (2006); Sung Hui Kim, The Last 
Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against 
Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 903-04 (2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as 
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013). 
149. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of 
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 714 (2013) (identifying the fiduciary conception of 
judging underlying the founding documents, establishing the duty to, among other things, 
“keep[] the legislature within its bounded authority”). 
150. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual 
Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 302, 358 (2011) 
(describing the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of constitutionality). 
151. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373-
86 (2003) (carefully working through the arguments as to why Lochner was wrongly 
decided, in an effort to harmonize its rejection with current constitutional law). 
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to why it was wrongly decided, and those can be better 
expressed in an article more focused on that topic.  My concern 
here has been with the methodology of Lochner, not its result. 
Using an exemplar case coming out of the education context, I 
have sought to show how, in rejecting a decision that we can 
probably all agree came out the wrong way, we also rejected the 
public-protective, and therefore proper, role for the courts as a 
check on legislative action that is irrational, protectionist, rent-
enabling, harmful to public servants, or otherwise contrary to the 
public interest—one that has worked well in many cases other 
than Lochner.152  Correcting that error is as easy as privileging 
precedents such as Plyler and Cleburne over those such as FCC. 
It’s high time we considered that. 
152. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Plyler, Cleburne, 
and Lawrence).  For an illuminating historical discussion of the Lochner era cases that 
upheld public protective legislation—even workplace restrictions—against constitutional 
challenges, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 51 (U. Chi. Press 2011). 
